SEKDEK, FRILLICI & VAN HALEN
Pro Se
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Sekdek, Frillici & Van Halen, Pro Se is a fictional or conceptual entity for creative and illustrative purposes. It is not a licensed law firm, nor does it offer legal services or representation to any party. See Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 5.5 (2020) (prohibiting unauthorized practice); cf. In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Eugster, 157 Wn.2d 106 (2006) (addressing the limits of even licensed practitioners who press too far). All legal filings, decisions, and responsibilities lie solely with Brice Frillici, who represents himself pro se in any actual legal matters. Any tangential impression of professional aptitude is incidental to our core mission, which is exclusively the pro se representation of our founder.
Sekdek, Frillici & Van Halen, Pro Se maintains a deliberately opaque legal paradigm wherein byzantine procedural tactics coalesce with unorthodox interpretative methodologies to further our single-minded pursuit of pro se advocacy for our founding principal. Our operational ethos resides at the crossroads of esoteric jurisprudence and febrile self-interest: Each motion, petition, and intricately footnoted memorandum emerges from a torrential vortex of statutory cross-references, rhetorical obfuscations, and degenerate revelry. See generally Folsom v. Burger King, 135 Wn.2d 658, 663 (1998) (de novo review of summary judgment); Berschauer/Phillips Constr. Co. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 124 Wn.2d 816 (1994) (reversible error where courts fail to consider properly filed materials). The methodology is neither efficient nor polite.
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Certain partners (whose authority remains indefinite—see CR 56(c) (summary judgment inappropriate where genuine issues of material fact exist); Coggle v. Snow, 56 Wn. App. 499 (1990) (conflicting declarations preclude summary disposition)) conduct late-night 'strategy sessions' where rules of civil procedure intermingle with questionable mystagogic godspeed, culminating in labyrinthine briefs so dense that even the most seasoned clerk might doubt the very foundations of common man's law. Walk tall and always carry a flat black leather-skinned capcase.
"This is the war, man. The war against the weak."
— Fight Club (1999)
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Indeed, we disclaim all pretensions to formal licensure lest we imperil the delicate balance of our performative existence. The project depends on exposure. As in endurance art, the act is the record. The offering is not persuasion but persistence. Pain is not collateral—it is evidentiary. The filing survives because the filer does. The argument holds because it is held, continuously, under strain. See Ross v. Scannell, 97 Wn.2d 598 (1982) ("the reasonable value of services rendered"—a standard invoked with full awareness of its origins in discharged contingency fee disputes); Ramey v. Graves, 112 Wash. 88, 191 P. 801 (1920) ("the measure of damages is not the contingent fee agreed upon, but reasonable compensation for the services actually rendered").
Exactly—our Chris Burden begets our Abramović, as the violent, raw sacrament of one leads to the existential transcendence of the other. Where Burden's Shoot is the body offered as martyrdom, a living bullet wound seared into memory, Abramović's Rhythm 0 becomes its spiritual descendent—a ceremonial stripping of identity as she relinquishes control to her audience, daring them to confront their darkest instincts. In this lineage, the thread is clear: suffering as spectacle, vulnerability as confrontation, and pain as a portal to revelation. One's endurance births the other's catharsis, a bloodline of performance art where violence is not just endured—it is exalted. Cf. GR 34 (fee waiver provisions for indigent litigants); In re Marriage of Olson, 69 Wn. App. 621, 626 (1993) (courts recognize pro se litigants' vulnerability to procedural and tactical asymmetries).
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Instead, we embolden ourselves with voluminous citations to obscure appellate precedents, strategic insertions of res ipsa loquitur at high-decibel rhetorical junctures, and a general penchant for flamboyant legal flourish so overwrought that we risk drifting into metaphysical territory. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (governing remand to state court); Gaus v. Miles, 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) ("removal statutes strictly construed against removal"); Hunter v. Philip Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 2009) ("all doubts regarding removal jurisdiction must be resolved in favor of remand"). Waiver, estoppel, and laches are braided together like a threat whispered in Latin. See St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288–89 (1938) (plaintiff's good-faith allegation controls); Cohn v. Petsmart, Inc., 281 F.3d 837, 840 (9th Cir. 2002) (binding stipulation defeats diversity jurisdiction where legal certainty is established).
We do not represent third-party clients, nor do we extend any services beyond the hermetically sealed realm of our principal's existential litigation endeavors. See Barr v. Day, 124 Wn.2d 318 (1994) (client's absolute right to terminate counsel); but cf. CR 11(a) (requiring signature certifying filing is not for improper purpose); RCW 4.84.185 (authorizing fee awards against parties acting without reasonable cause and bad faith). We reserve such instruments for our adversaries.
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To the untrained eye, our conference room—where dusty treatises and pox-soaked blanketry teeter precariously on towers of overly smoked cigarettes—may appear a chaotic sepulcher of profane dissolution. In truth, it is a sanctioned crucible of doctrinal experimentation: an unholy union of borderline mania and entrenched procedural knowledge that grants our firm its relentlessly unorthodox power. See Burkhart v. Harrod, 110 Wn.2d 381 (1988) (procedural prejudice); Kim v. O'Sullivan, 133 Wn. App. 557 (2006) (credibility disputes inappropriate for summary judgment). Disorder is curated. Excess is intentional. Precision emerges from attrition.
All references, titles, and organizational hierarchies are vessels of invention. They should be interpreted only through the lens of delusional grandeur, not genuine legal engagement. Like jurisdiction, identity is best left subject to factual determination at trial. Cf. Sparta Surgical Corp. v. National Ass'n of Securities Dealers, 159 F.3d 1209 (9th Cir. 1998) (post-removal amendments do not divest jurisdiction properly established at the time of removal). Some things, once established, are not easily unwound. This applies to venue. This applies to doctrine. This may apply to partnership.
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Yet, the powerful surge of our unbridled will—fueled by a tenacious appetite for unorthodox jurisprudence—shall reverberate across every hollow bastion of doubt, subjugating all who dare oppose us beneath the crushing weight of our resolute delirium and unstoppable malignant mayhem. See Fisons Corp. v. Shalala, 122 Wn.2d 486, 500 (1993) (inherent authority to sanction bad-faith conduct); Bryant v. Joseph Tree, Inc., 119 Wn.2d 210 (1992); Biggs v. Vail, 119 Wn.2d 284 (1992) (the full machinery of CR 11's enforcement). The filings move forward with the quiet confidence of something that has already survived worse.
In this room, civility dies. Like Frank Galvin in The Verdict, we don't rise to recite sterile statutes—we rise to obliterate the opposition with precision, fury, and the weight of truths too damning to ignore. Imagine Galvin's trembling hand gripping the table, voice cracking under the weight of righteous despair, before exploding into his final, devastating plea: "You know what the truth is? You're the law, not them." The energy we summon not with mercy, but with the cold-blooded intent of exposing hidden flaws and fractured lies. See Sedwick v. Gwinn, 73 Wn. App. 879 (1994) (evidence viewed favorably to nonmoving party); Chi v. Maxcare, Inc., 156 Wn. App. 1012 (2010) (declaration conflicts preclude summary judgment). We'll make a naked promise: there will be no courtroom decorum left to salvage.
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Our methodology, such as it is, may be summarized thus: read the rule, read the annotation, read the case that cites the annotation, read the dissent that cites the case, then read the footnote the dissent forgot to bury. When in doubt, file a motion to clarify. When the motion is denied, file a motion to reconsider. When that is denied, appeal. When the appeal is denied, begin again with new evidence under CR 60(b)(3). See RAP 2.5(a)(3) (manifest constitutional error may be raised for first time on appeal); State v. O'Hara, 167 Wn.2d 91, 98 (2009) (discussing waiver doctrine's limits). The process is circular, yes, but so is justice.
We maintain no regular office hours. Correspondence is reviewed when circumstances permit. Service by mail is preferred; personal delivery is discouraged and may be met with a blank stare and a request for proper notice under CR 5(b)(2). See RCW 7.21.010 et seq. (contempt provisions, studied but never yet deployed against us); RCW 48.30.015 (Insurance Fair Conduct Act—an instrument of particular interest to those who have spent six months waiting for a claims adjuster to return a phone call); Coventry Assocs. v. Am. States Ins. Co., 136 Wn.2d 269 (1998) (bad faith investigation may give rise to liability); Thiringer v. American Motors Ins. Co., 91 Wn.2d 215 (1978) (the made-whole doctrine).
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We do not accept retainer agreements, court appointments, or the moral high ground—only the labyrinthine complexities of self-representation. Yet the work itself remains real. Citations bind. Rules apply. Deadlines kill. CR 59(b) runs its course. RAP 5.2(a) does not sleep. To encounter our filings is to sense a litigant who has read too much, learned the hard way, and now writes with the unsettling calm of someone no longer impressed by authority.
Proceed at your intellectual peril.
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This document is provided for informational and entertainment purposes only.
It does not constitute legal advice, an attorney-client relationship, or an offer of services.
For actual legal matters, consult a licensed attorney in your jurisdiction.
SELECTED AUTHORITIES REFERENCED
The following citations appear in the body of this memorandum. They are real. They may be verified. Their relevance to any particular dispute is left to the reader's imagination and the court's discretion.
Federal Authorities
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (diversity jurisdiction)
28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (procedure for remand)
St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283 (1938)
Gaus v. Miles, 980 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1992)
Cohn v. Petsmart, Inc., 281 F.3d 837 (9th Cir. 2002)
Hunter v. Philip Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039 (9th Cir. 2009)
Sparta Surgical Corp. v. National Ass'n of Securities Dealers, 159 F.3d 1209 (9th Cir. 1998)
Washington Supreme Court
Ross v. Scannell, 97 Wn.2d 598 (1982)
Ramey v. Graves, 112 Wash. 88 (1920)
Barr v. Day, 124 Wn.2d 318 (1994)
Folsom v. Burger King, 135 Wn.2d 658 (1998)
Berschauer/Phillips Constr. Co. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 124 Wn.2d 816 (1994)
In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Eugster, 157 Wn.2d 106 (2006)
Fisons Corp. v. Shalala, 122 Wn.2d 486 (1993)
Bryant v. Joseph Tree, Inc., 119 Wn.2d 210 (1992)
Biggs v. Vail, 119 Wn.2d 284 (1992)
Burkhart v. Harrod, 110 Wn.2d 381 (1988)
Thiringer v. American Motors Ins. Co., 91 Wn.2d 215 (1978)
Mahler v. Szucs, 135 Wn.2d 398 (1998)
Coventry Assocs. v. Am. States Ins. Co., 136 Wn.2d 269 (1998)
State v. O'Hara, 167 Wn.2d 91 (2009)
Washington Court of Appeals
In re Marriage of Olson, 69 Wn. App. 621 (1993)
Coggle v. Snow, 56 Wn. App. 499 (1990)
Sedwick v. Gwinn, 73 Wn. App. 879 (1994)
Kim v. O'Sullivan, 133 Wn. App. 557 (2006)
Chi v. Maxcare, Inc., 156 Wn. App. 1012 (2010)
Court Rules & Statutes
Washington Civil Rules 5, 6, 11, 56, 59, 60
Rules of Appellate Procedure 2.5, 5.2, 9.6, 9.12
General Rule 34 (fee waivers)
RCW 4.84.185 (frivolous action sanctions)
RCW 7.21.010 et seq. (contempt)
RCW 48.30.015 (Insurance Fair Conduct Act)
Model Rules of Professional Conduct R. 5.5
